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NOTE
EXPANDING THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TO ESTABLISH EFFICIENCY
AND FAIRNESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
I. INTRODUCTION
How is an administrative law judge ("ALJ") to know his role in the
modern bureaucracy? On the one hand, the law requires the ALJ to adju-
dicate legal disputes between the government agency and the individual,
and on the other hand, a black-robed member of the judicial branch in-
structs him that he is out of his jurisdiction. Who wins in this decades-
long battle for turf?
Courts typically find that the ALJ has exceeded the scope of his power
if he decides a constitutional question. Recently, however, one enlight-
ened court pronounced the propriety of an agency hearing officer's review
of constitutional issues raised in an agency case. In Mowbray v. Kozlow-
ski,1 the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
asserted that an administrative agency's refusal to hear issues of federal
law violated the litigant's due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 The district court recognized that due process is satisfied
when a claimant challenging administrative action in an agency adjudica-
1. 724 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va. 1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1990). The court held
that Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (1988), authorizes the
state agency responsible for administering Medicaid benefits to address federal law ques-
tions during administrative appeals. Mowbray, 724 F. Supp. at 418. In Mowbray, Judge
Michael determined that the state agency's refusal to hear issues of federal law violated the
federal Medicaid Act.
2. Id. The court stated:
[o]ne of the rights generally agreed to be included in the general term "Due Process"
is the right to a "fair hearing." A hearing from which a discussion of federal law is
excluded, particularly where the thrust of the argument is that the state action is
illegal under that law, is certainly not a "fair" one.
Id.
For a discussion of the requirements of a fair hearing in accord with due process, see
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
What procedures are due depends on the nature of the government benefit denied.
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tive hearing can raise constitutional law issues and contest the legality of
federal and state statutes. The court concluded that allowing administra-
tive agencies to consider constitutional and statutory issues initially,
rather than waiting to do so on review, would provide for a more "effi-
cient allocation of resources."' The benefits of this conclusion are that the
agency hearing officer would have the opportunity to review legal issues
prior to judicial consideration and could require state compliance with
federal or constitutional law.4
Although Judge Michael's dictum may not be earth-shattering, the rec-
ommendation should grab the attention of black-robed judges and ALJs
alike. It is important because administrative agencies and administrative
law judges generally lack the power to determine the constitutionality of
statutes or questions involving fundamental, constitutional rights raised
by claimants.5 The general rule is applicable in formal administrative ad-
judications6 at both the state and federal levels.8
3. Mowbray, 724 F. Supp. at 418.
4. Judge Michael declared that:
[a]llowing appellants to raise the issue [of federal law or of the state rule's legality]
before the state agency gives the state the first crack at considering the issue and
perhaps bringing state regulations into compliance. A hearing officer is not bound to
accept the appellant's argument; however, making the agency aware of a potential
conflict may well prevent the expense of litigation and encourage thoughtful, internal
review.
Id.
5. Courts have failed to explain sufficiently why administrative agencies do not possess
the jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of regulations or statutes. Indeed, in one of
the leading cases on the subject, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that the Selec-
tive Service System Boards have the authority neither to pronounce regulations nor to pass
on the validity of regulations or statutes due to the composition of the boards. Oestereich v.
Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968). According to the Court, such
authority is properly denied because the boards are composed of part-time volunteers and
the hearings are mostly "nonjudicial." Id. at 242-43.
6. Formal administrative adjudications are governed by 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (1988 & Supp.
III 1991). The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") defines "adjudication" as the "agency
process for the formulation of" any "final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunc-
tive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a riatter other than rule making but including
licensing." Id. § 551(6), (7).
7. E.g., MO. CONST. art. 5, § 3; Bohn v. Waddell, 790 P.2d 772 (Ariz. T.C. 1990) (adminis-
trative body has no power to determine if statute complies with constitution); Hamilton v.
Jeffrey Stone Co., 641 S.W.2d 723 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (although Worker's Compensation
Commission may not have authority to hold challenged statutes unconstitutional, these is-
sues should first be raised at administrative law judge level); Crocker v. Department of Rev-
enue, 652 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982); Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 464 A.2d 785 (Conn. 1983), aff'd,
472 U.S. 703 (1985); Palm Harbor Special Fire Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So. 2d 249 (Fla.
1987); Flint River Mills v. Henry, 216 S.E.2d 895 (Ga. 1975); HOH Corp. v. Motor Vehicle
Indus. Licensing Bd., 736 P.2d 1271 (Haw. 1987) (agency cannot determine constitutionality
of its enabling statute); Wilson v. Board of Employrment Sec. Div., 385 N.E.2d 438 (Ind.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 874 (1979); Kaufman v. Department of Social and Rehabilitative
Servs., 811 P.2d 876 (Kan. 1991) (administrative boards/agencies cannot rule on constitu-
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Some progressive courts have created exceptions to the general rule
that administrative agencies cannot decide constitutional questions.
Courts have recognized an agency's authority to address constitutional
concerns in, among other matters, tax disputes,9 retirement cases,10 town
appraisal cases,1  and abatement adjudications. 2 The New Jersey Su-
tional questions); Red River Coors, Inc. v. McNamara, 577 So. 2d 187 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(Board of Tax Appeals has no authority to determine constitutionality of a statute); Hart-
ford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 551 N.E.2d 502 (Mass. 1990)
(Commissioner did not have authority to determine motor vehicle liability insurer's claims
that residual market insurance system was unconstitutional); Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 310
N.W.2d 321, 324 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (administrative agencies have no power to determine
constitutional questions); Jarussi v. Board of Trustees, 664 P.2d 316, 318 (Mont. 1983)
("Constitutional questions are properly decided by a judicial body, not an administrative
official, under the constitutional principle of separation of powers."); Nebraska Pub. Em-
ployees, Local No. 251 v. City of Omaha, 457 N.W.2d 429 (Neb. 1990) (Commission of In-
dustrial Relations has no authority to vindicate constitutional rights); Montez v. J & B Ra-
diator, Inc., 779 P.2d 129, 131 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989); First Bank of Buffalo v. Conrad, 350
N.W.2d 580, 585, (N.D. 1984); Herrick v. Kosydar, 339 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1975); Dow Jones &
Co. v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 787 P.2d 843, 845 (Okla. 1990) ("Within the
framework of Oklahoma's tripartite distribution of government powers, the authority to in-
validate an unconstitutional enactment resides solely in the judicial department.") (empha-
sis in original); Board of Pharmacy v. Walgreen Texas Co., 520 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Ct. App.
1975) (administrative agencies have no power to determine constitutionality of statutes);
Commonwealth ex rel. State Water Control Bd. v. Appalachian Power Co., 386 S.E.2d 633
(Va. Ct. App. 1989) (if issue falls outside agency's competence such as constitutional and
statutory interpretation, little deference is required to be accorded agency's decision); Prisk
v. City of Poulsbo, 732 P.2d 1013 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); Belco Petroleum Corp. v. Board of
Equalization, 587 P.2d 204 (Wyo. 1978) (administrative agency has no authority to deter-
mine constitutionality of statute); see also 4 KENNETH CuLp DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 26:6, at 434 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter DAviS, 1983].
8. E.g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977) ("Constitutional questions obviously
are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the
courts is essential to the decision of such questions."); Oestereich v. Selective Servs. Bd., 393
U.S. 233, 242 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Buckeye Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 587
F.2d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 1979) ("No administrative tribunal of the United States has the
authority to declare unconstitutional the Act which it is called upon to administer."); Spie-
gel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 294 (7th Cir. 1976) (FTC exceeded scope of authority in
determining Due Process violation because agencies lack expertise to determine the consti-
tutionality of administrative or legislative action); Finnerty v. Cowen, 508 F.2d 979 (2d Cir.
1974); Hillhaven West, Inc. v. Bowen, 669 F. Supp. 312 (S.D. Cal. 1987) (federal administra-
tive agencies are without power to pass on constitutionality of administrative action); see
also 3 KENNETH CuLP DAvIS, AMIsNisTRATtvE LAW TREATISE, § 20.04, at 74 (1958) [hereinaf-
ter DAvis, 1958].
9. See In re McCannel, 301 N.W.2d 910, 919 (Minn. 1980). The court in McCannel took
note, however, of the general rule that agencies lack the power to determine the constitu-
tionality of statutes and that such issues are determined by resort to the judicial system. Id.
(citing Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1973)).
10. See Crawford v. Tennessee Consol. Retirement Sys., 732 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1987) (Consolidated Retirement System had the power to consider constitutional questions
in making determination concerning retirement rights of members of the Attorneys General
Retirement System).
11. See Alexander v. Town of Barton, 565 A.2d 1294 (Vt. 1989).
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preme Court has found an exception essential, for example, where the
agency deems it necessary to resolve questions within its jurisdiction. 8
Another court permitted agency review where the particular agency pos-
sesses "unique[] judicial powers" such that its decisions "are accorded the
same finality and deference as those of the district court."' 4 Although the
prevailing view denies administrative agencies the power to review consti-
tutional issues, departures from this rule suggest that ALJs have the abil-
ity to provide complete, initial records of both the factual and legal issues
raised in a particular case.
As proposed by Mowbray, judicial resources may indeed be more effi-
ciently allocated where agency adjudicators have the capacity to consider
constitutional and other legal issues. This Note addresses whether state
and federal ALJs should have the power to decide constitutional ques-
tions during agency hearings. Part II examines the present state of the
law and the policies behind the traditional limitations of the powers of
agencies and ALJs. Part III illustrates the changes which have occurred
in the system through increased adjudicator independence and skill, as
well as through reform of the agency hearing process by enactment of the
Administrative Procedure Act 15 and the shifts in some states towards del-
egation of judicial power to ALJs. Part IV recommends granting greater
decision-making power to agency adjudicators in order to develop a com-
plete record of all factual and legal issues for greater judicial efficiency
and participant satisfaction.
Although judicial review of agency action continues to provide a check
on any abuses of agency adjudicative power,'6 the agency hearing would
better satisfy due process in many cases if the participants could raise all
legal and factual issues in that forum. Further, requiring the ALJ to meet
the educational standards required of the black-robed judge would maxi-
mize judicial economy and fairness and produce well-reasoned decisions.
12. See Newlin Corp. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 579 A.2d 996 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1990) (constitutional challenges to abatement order issued by Department of Environmental
Resources could be adjudicated before Department's Environmental Hearing Board).
13. See Christian Bros. Inst. v. Northern New Jersey Interscholastic League, 432 A.2d 26
(N.J. 1981) (administrative agencies have power to consider constitutional issues only if rel-
evant and necessary to resolve questions concededly within their jurisdiction); see also Rob-
erts v. Coughlin, 561 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (constitutional challenge hinging
on factual issues reviewable at administrative level should first be addressed to administra-
tive agency to establish necessary factual record).
14. In re McCannel, 301 N.W.2d 910, 919 (Minn. 1980).
15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 7521 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
16. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides in pertinent part: "To the extent
necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant ques-
tions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). This section continues
with a description of the duties and the proper scope of review imposed upon the reviewing
court.
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Finally, appropriate administrative settlement of legal questions would
arguably be preferable to the delay and expense which often impede the
litigation process when seeking adequate relief in the judicial system.
II. PRESENT STATE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SYSTEM
It is the general rule in both state and federal administrative law that
an agency adjudicator may not address the constitutionality of statutes
and agency actions. Examination of the scope of the general rule yields
insufficient explanation for such a broad restraint on an AL's power. In
addition, analysis of traditional perceptions of the administrative agency
and its role in our government reveals apprehension without valid foun-
dation for granting any definitive decision-making power to agency
adjudicators.
A. Scope of the General Prohibition on the Agency's Power
One of the most frequently cited cases for the rule limiting agency ad-
judicative power is Public Utilities Commission v. United States,'17 in
which the United States Supreme Court declared that a state agency
could "hardly be expected to entertain" constitutional issues.' The Court
concluded there that "where the only question [presented] is whether it is
constitutional to fasten the administrative procedure onto the litigant,
the administrative agency may be defied and judicial relief sought as the
only effective way of protecting the asserted constitutional right."' 9 Thus,
the Court pronounced its own proficiency at protecting individual liber-
ties. However, the Court and those courts adopting the rationale of Public
Utilities Commission have failed to provide convincing reasons for pro-
scribing an agency's power to protect constitutional rights. 0 In Public
Utilities Commission, the Supreme Court asserted the limitation on the
agency's adjudicative powers without divulging the historical bases be-
hind or the legitimate policies for such a rule.
Similarly, in Oestereich v. Selective Services Board,21 the concurring
opinion maintained that administrative agencies do not have the jurisdic-
tion to review the constitutionality of statutes. 2 The concurrence noted
17. 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
18. Id. at 539.
19. Id. at 540.
20. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974); Oestereich v. Selective Servs.
Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); HOH Corp. v. Motor Vehicle Indus.
Licensing Bd., 736 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Haw. 1987) ("The law has long been clear that agencies
may not nullify statutes.").
21. 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
22. Id. at 242 ("Adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has gen-
erally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. See Public Utilities
Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539 (1958); Engineers Public Service Co. v. SEC, 78
1992]
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that the administrative agency in question did not possess the power to
issue regulations or the authority to address the legitimacy of regulations
or statutes.23 Justice Harlan wrote:
Such authority cannot readily be inferred, for the composition of Boards,
and their administrative procedures, render them wholly unsuitable forums
for the adjudication of these matters: local and appeal Boards consist of
part-time, uncompensated members, chosen ideally to be representative of
the registrants' communities; the fact that a registrant may not be repre-
sented by counsel in Selective Service proceedings, 32 CFR sec. 1624.1(b),
seems incompatible with the Boards' serious consideration of such purely
legal claims.2 '
In this case, Justice Harlan defended the position that agencies are unfit
to resolve constitutional questions on the grounds that the Selective Ser-
vice Board, the administrative agency in question, was composed of
"part-time, uncompensated members."2" His concurrence implied that
only full-time employees could provide adequate forums for claimants,
represented by counsel, to challenge the constitutionality of statutes.
However, mere part-time status or lack of compensation, without proof
that such status illustrates a lack of competence, hardly justifies the gen-
eral proscription.26
The absence of convincing justification for the limiting doctrine sug-
gests that the restriction may exist simply because, in the words of Ros-
coe Pound, "[e]xecutive justice is an evil."2 Without a more satisfactory
explanation for the restriction than repugnancy towards the concept of
the administrative agency itself, the need for greater allocation of power
to the agency adjudicator is obvious. As Oliver Wendell Holmes stated:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past.28
U.S. App. D.C. 199, 215-16, 138 F.2d 936, 952-53 (1943), dismissed as moot, 332 U.S. 788.")
(Harlan, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 242.
24. Id. at 242-43 (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 242.
26. Would the concurrence also then agree that judges who reduce their workload by tak-
ing senior status, reflecting a typical part-time position, are any less competent to hear
cases?
27. Roscoe Pound, Executive Justice, 55 AM. L. REG. 137, 145 (1907). Pound wrote: "It
always has been and it always will be crude and as variable as the personalities of officials."
Id. This critic suggested that "[t]he only way to check the onward march of executive justice
is to improve the output of judicial justice till the adjustment of human relations by our
courts is brought into thorough accord with the moral sense of the public at large." Id. at
146.
28. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
[Vol. 27:103
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A persuasive and leading authority provides a more plausible basis for
proscribing an agency's power to determine constitutional issues. In
Panitz v. District of Columbia,29 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia acknowledged that a tax assessor, as an administrative officer,
holds no inherent power to decide constitutional challenges to a tax. Rec-
ognizing that the judiciary alone possesses the inherent power to resolve
constitutional questions, the court reasoned that the government's inter-
est in efficiency is paramount to the agency hearing officer's interest in
overturning laws which do not conform to his own views as to whether a
law violates the Constitution. 0 The court in Panitz feared the decline of
government order and efficiency should it recognize an inherent power in
the administrative agency to invalidate laws for lack of constitutionality.
Rather, the court reasoned that even the judiciary exercises sparingly its
power to invalidate unconstitutional laws. 31
However, argument can be made that although agencies lack the inher-
ent power to nullify statutes, legislatures are not precluded from delegat-
ing such power to agencies. Indeed, in Minnesota, the legislature dele-
gated to the state worker's compensation court of appeals final authority
on questions of law relating to worker's compensation.32 Still, the power
to interpret the validity of administrative rules and the constitutionality
of laws remains with the judiciary.33 Further, by constitutional provision,
California delegates to the state Publib Utilities Commission broad judi-
29. 112 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
30. The court stated:
Interruption of the machinery of government necessarily attendant on this function
not only cautions the judiciary but argues as well against its exercise by other agen-
cies. It is this consideration for the orderly, efficient functioning of the processes of
government which makes it impossible to recognize in administrative officers any in-
herent power to nullify legislative enactments because of personal belief that they
contravene the constitution. Thus it is held that ministerial officers cannot question
the constitutionality of the statute under which they operate.
Id. at 42. The court advanced the notion that "[l]ikewise, it has been held that an adminis-
trative agency invested with discretion has no jurisdiction to entertain constitutional ques-
tions where no provision has been made therefor." Id.; see also Engineers Pub. Serv. Co. v.
SEC, 138 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (adopting the language in Panitz).
31. Panitz, 112 F.2d at 41 ("there can be little doubt that it represents the highest exer-
cise of judicial power, and, one that even the judiciary is reluctant to exercise.").
32. MINN. STAT. § 175A.01, subd. 5 (1984) (the agency has "sole, exclusive, and final au-
thority for the hearing and determination of all questions of law and fact arising under the
worker's compensation laws"). -
33. See Quam v. State, 391 N.W.2d 803, 809 n.6 (Minn. 1986). There, the court
recognized:
[w]hile the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the WCCA [Worker's Compensation
Court of Appeals] is broad, it could not include the power to adjudicate the adher-
ence of agency rules to their statutory parameters. This function is solely within the-
judicial province and cannot be assumed by an agency tribunal without violating con-
stitutional principles of separation of powers.
Id. (citing MINN. CONsT. art. III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 2, art. III, § 1).
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cial powers34 and by statute restricts judicial review to examining whether
the agency's decisions violate a litigant's federal or state constitutional
rights.3 5
Courts have also been unwilling to recognize judicial powers in agency
adjudicators because of the assumption that agency hearing officers are
inferior to black-robed judges. In State ex rel. New Orleans Canal Bank-
ing Co. v. Heard," a Louisiana court articulated the presumption of con-
stitutionality of statutes and contended that the "subordinate executive
functionaries" must treat the statutes as constitutional until a court de-
termines otherwise.3 7 The court upheld the position that the second-class
status of the administrative agent precludes reliance on the agent to form
a comprehensible and orderly conclusion regarding the validity of the law.
However, the court offered little guidance as to the reasons for assuming
that the administrative agency is subordinate in the first place.
B. Historical Perceptions of the Administrative Agency
Although one cannot discern from the present state of the law any sub-
stantial justification for the limiting doctrine, several theories can explain
the apprehension about granting agency adjudicators the authority to de-
cide constitutional questions. Public skepticism exists for several possible
reasons, including: the absence of the proper check and balance on the
agency's abuse of power; the lack of conclusiveness in the decisions of
agency adjudicators; the distinctions perceived between judges and ALJs;
and the overall ineffectiveness in the administrative process.3 8 These fac-
tors, discussed below, contribute to what some call an ongoing "crisis" in
the administrative process itself.39
34. CAL. CONST. XII, § 22.
35. CAL. PUB. UTn. CODE, §§ 1756-1760.
36. 18 So. 746 (La. 1895).
37. Id. at 752. The court stated that "in a well-regulated government obedience to its laws
by executive officers is absolutely essential and of paramount importance. Were it not so,
the most inextricable confusion would inevitably result." Id.; see also State ex rel. Chicago,
R.I. & P. Ry. v. Becker, 41 S.W.2d 188, 190-91 (Mo. 1931) (quoting Heard in support of the
proposition).
38. See James 0. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1041, 1041 (1975) [hereinafter Freedman].
39. Id. The author suggests that "[e]ach generation has tended to define the crisis in its
own terms, usually by focusing upon a major question that has attracted its attention and
reforming impulses." Id.
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1. The Origins of the Federal Administrative Agency
During the New Deal era, the public perceived the administrative
agency as a useful vehicle for carrying out government policies. 40 The fed-
eral administrative agencies were created to perform executive, legislative
and judicial tasks and to act as liaisons between citizen and government,
moderating controversies which involved complex issues. 4 1 The agencies
instituted public policies and afforded remedies to citizens injured by the
abuse of agency power.42
In their early history, administrative agencies appointed hearing exam-
iners from among their own employees to conduct dispute resolution
hearings apart from judicial tribunals. Agencies could overlook the deci-
sions made by these examiners, however, and make de novo determina-
tions regarding the disputes.4' This oversight power often rendered the
examiner's decision a worthless exercise in adjudication and guaranteed
that the agency's decision usually would prevail over participant satisfac-
tion and procedural fairness. The agency bias thus displayed seems to
have provided one of the bases for congressional reform.
The enactment of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
("APA") 44 elevated the status of federal hearing examiners and increased
their independence from the employer agencies. Under the APA, the
agency hearing was designed to provide an alternative to court resolution
"for reasons of convenience" because the conflicts generally arose out of
the administrative agency's dealings with individual cases and such dis-
putes involved technical aspects of the agency's procedures and rules. 45
However, the APA did not allay public concern that the very existence of
the administrative agency posed a threat to the necessary division of pow-
ers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches.
40. Id.; see also DAvis, 1958, supra note 8, § 1.04, at 27. The notion of an administrative
agency first appeared by way of congressional enactment of two statutes in 1789; one taxed
imports, Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 (1789), and one related to claims for military
pensions and veterans benefits, Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, § 1, 1 Stat. 95 (1789). See
Freedman, supra note 38, at 1045; DAvis, 1983, supra note 7, § 1:07, at 17.
41. MALCOLM C. RICH & WAYNE E. BRUCAR, THE CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR ADMINISTRA-
TIvE LAW JUDGES 8 (1983) [hereinafter RICH & BRUCAR].
42. Rich and Brucar suggest that the administrative "process has, for nearly a century,
helped establish public policy while providing administrative procedures to protect against
perceived abuses of power by governmental agencies." Id. at 1.
43. Id. at 8.
44. 60 Stat. 327 (1946).
45. DAvis, 1958, supra note 8, § 1.05, at 38.
1992]
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2. A Jealous Judiciary and Separation of Powers
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.
46
Chief Justice John Marshall pronounced the preeminence of the Article
III courts in resolving matters of law as he interpreted the Constitution's
mandate for the separation of powers among the executive, legislative and
judicial branches.47 Recent attempts to delegate to the administrative ad-
judicator the power to resolve constitutional questions have encountered
criticism against empowering the agency with such authority that "will
give impetus to the movement to abrogate or limit this power of the
courts. '48 This apprehension reflects an unnecessary guarding by the judi-
ciary of its power - unnecessary considering the proper checks and bal-
ances inherent in our system of government.
Although the doctrine of separation of powers represents a long-stand-
ing "political maxim,' 49 the Constitution does not command that courts
46. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
47. Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides that:
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1. It has been noted, however, that when the Chief Justice pronounced
the duty of the judiciary, critics repudiated the notion that the judiciary held the right to
determine the constitutionality of a duly enacted statute. See State ex rel. Atlantic Coast
Line 'R. Co. v. Board of Equalizers, 94 So. 681, 682 (Fla. 1922). The court in Atlantic Coast
Line related that "[g]reat publicists, including Mr. Thomas Jefferson, Spencer Roan, Niles,
of Niles' Register, and others denied the right of the courts to pass upon the constitutional-
ity of a regularly enacted statute. Andrew Jackson also thundered against it." Id.
48. Atlantic Coast Line, 94 So. at 682. The court in Atlantic Coast Line adhered to the
presumption that statutes are constitutional until judicially declared otherwise. Id. at 683.
49. James Madison explained that the doctrine of separation of powers represented a
"political maxim" among early Americans who feared the reign of tyranny if all government
power were vested in or acquired by one body. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 323 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Madison borrowed from Montesquieu to illustrate his
"political maxim":
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body...
there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or
senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. ...
Were [the power of judging] joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with all the violence of an oppressor.
Id. at 326 (emphasis in original); see also Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE ACTION 32 (1965).
Addressing the people of New York in 1788, Madison acknowledged:
One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the
Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political maxim, that the legislative, ex-
ecutive and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct.
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must initially determine questions of law regarding either public or pri-
vate rights.5 Without a constitutional prohibition, other entities may per-
missibly address legal and constitutional questions. The constitutional
framers must have realized that a complete segregation would produce an
ineffective operation of government and would prove impossible to
maintain.51
In the absence of an express prohibition on the exercise of such powers,
administrative agencies should be able to perform both rule-making func-
tions in executing their programs, as well as independent quasi-judicial
functions in settling conflicts as long as ALJs are guided by fairness. The
separation of powers doctrine incorporates this notion of fairness in gov-
ernment relations with individuals. Accordingly, the person who adminis-
ters the rules does not judge the fair application of those rules.52
Nevertheless, public sentiment has traditionally opposed the accumula-
tion and exercise of judicial powers by an administrative agency. Al-
... The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same
hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 323-24. The principle is well-grounded in the constitutional dele-
gation of authority to the courts to interpret laws and not expressly to the executive or the
legislature.
50. See Note, The Authority of Administrative Agencies to Consider the Constitutional-
ity of Statutes, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1682, 1686 (1977) [hereinafter Note, The Authority of
Administrative Agencies]. The author correctly observes that "there is nothing in the judi-
cial power clause which has been held to require that preliminary determination of ques-
tions of law - whether relating to private or public rights - be made in an article III court
or in any court at all for that matter." Id. In the absence of an express prohibition in the
Constitution or from Congress, an agency could derive by implication the authority to ad-
dress the constitutionality of legislative or administrative action, subject to judicial review.
51. See JAFFE, supra note 49, at 29 ("If the exact form given to [the separation of powers]
at any one moment of its history were taken as a literal prescription, it would strangle the
process of government. But it was never meant so."). While the concern for the monopoly of
power by one branch is valid, the author suggests that the drafters of the Constitution must
not have intended a total division of command. Id.
James Madison argued that although the Constitution distinguished the executive, legisla-
tive, and judiciary, it did not proscribe the execution by the separate branches of various
powers common to one of the other branches. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 335 (James
Madison). Madison quotes Thomas Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia that "no bar-
rier was provided between these several powers," id., suggesting the interplay between the
three branches. See also JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 260-61 (1978) [herein-
after CRISIs] ("The Constitution requires that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers
be separated to the extent necessary to prevent the emergence of tyranny from the concen-
tration of too much power in a single person or institution. But the lines that the Framers
drew between the exercise of the respective powers are not rigid ones ... "); DAVIS, 1958,
supra note 8, § 1.09, at 70-71.
52. PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 14 (1989). Here, the author relates the theory of the separation of the judicial from
the executive and legislative branches to the theory of "natural justice" under British com-
mon law.
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though the Constitution does not expressly prohibit the exercise of such
powers, the law reflects the public's apprehension."3 Indeed, courts have
declared that Congress may not grant to a "non-Article III" court, such as
an administrative agency, the jurisdiction to determine a "private right,
that is, the liability of one individual to another."
5
'
Analysts of the administrative process have offered a more comprehen-
sive review of the functions of agencies, as well as suggestions for improv-
ing the administrative process.5 In 1941, the Attorney General's Commit-
tee on Administrative Procedure addressed recommendations for a
complete separation of agency functions but suggested that an internal
separation of functions between hearing officer and agency investigator
would better contribute to the objectivity and effectiveness of the hearing
process. 50 The Committee's report, which proposed to separate the judi-
cial functions from the prosecutorial functions within each administrative
agency, formalized the adjudication process, created the role of the inde-
pendent hearing examiner, and provided the groundwork for the enact-
53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.").
54. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932). Now, however, administrative agencies can
adjudicate cases involving "private rights" as long as their decisions are subject to review,
and as long as the parties are not entitled, at common law, to a jury trial on the issue. JAFFE,
supra note 49, at 91.
Similar to the concerns expressed by the judiciary, President Roosevelt's special commit-
tee, appointed in 1937 to review the administrative process, criticized agencies for forming
"a headless fourth branch of government," undermining the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers because of the multiple functions performed by the agencies. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 39 (1937). One author admits that although the
fervor over this encroachment on the separation of powers has subsided in recent years with
the enactment of the APA in 1946, "the conceptual concern that it expressed has not been
laid to rest," noting that the doctrine has served as an impediment to the growth of the
administrative process. See Freedman, supra note 38, at 1049.
55. In 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt requested United States Attorney General
Murphy to designate a committee to analyze the exigency of refinement in the administra-
tive law field. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENcIES, FINAL REPORT OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1941) [hereinafter REPORT].
56. "The proposal is accordingly made that the deciding powers of Federal administrative
agencies should be vested in separate tribunals which are independent of the bodies charged
with the functions of prosecution and perhaps other functions of administration." Id. at 55.
The Committee urged that "an internal separation of function can afford substantially com-
plete protection against the danger that impartiality of decision will be impaired by the
personal precommitments of the investigator and the advocate." Id. at 57.
The Committee recognized the important role which agencies play in promoting public
policy. The report indicated that the Attorney General's Committee considered "the distin-
guishing feature of an 'administrative' agency the power to determine, either by rule or by
decision, private rights and obligations." Id. at 7. The power to determine an individual's
private rights would seem to include fundamental constitutional rights.
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ment of the APA in 1946.57 The report asserted that separation of powers
would not be offended if hearing examiners supplied accurate and com-
plete records of the factual and legal issues raised in the hearings. Yet,
public hostility towards the very concept of administrative regulation it-
self continued to bolster skepticism of an agency's competency to perform
tasks other than administering executive agency policies.
3. Distrust of Regulation
Public uncertainty regarding the regulation process itself reflects an-
other plausible theory behind the traditional attack on an agency's exis-
tence."8 One commentator asserted that:
[w]hen a nation cannot find the intellectual wherewithal to formulate a co-
herent ideology on an issue as fundamental to its values as the balance to be
struck between a free market and state regulation, such regulation as it does
authorize will always be subject to philosophic as well as pragmatic
question.59
In light of the public ambivalence towards the appropriate role of admin-
istrative agencies, federal legislation has defined the purposes to be
served by the agencies in vague terms. The absence of explicit delegation
by the legislature has forced agencies to draft and implement their own
governing policies,60 has invited public rebuke, 61 and has created adminis-
trative inefficiency. Public uncertainty as to the appropriate scope of an
agency's power and legislative failure in defining that scope illuminate the
policies behind the absence of agency adjudicator authority to consider
statutory and constitutional issues.
57. See RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 41, at 8. The authors note that "[t]he Committee
report marked an emerging emphasis on formalized adjudication within the administrative
system. The process was to utilize an independent examiner to provide a semblance of sepa-
ration of powers within the administrative process." Id.
58. See Freedman, supra note 38, at 1053 ("[t]he imprecision of the ideology that justifies
the existence of administrative agencies reflects the basic ambivalence of our society toward
the process of regulation").
59. Id. at 1053-54.
60. See id. at 1054.
61. Id. Congress's failure to delegate specific powers to the agencies renders the agencies
"vulnerable to the private interests they were created to regulate." Id. at 1055. Freedman
suggests that Congress is to blame for the criticism of the agencies and the criticism has had
negative implications on the legitimacy of the administrative process. He further suggests
that the negative implications are "not the result of any inherent qualities of the adminis-
trative process itself." See CRISIS, supra note 51, at 263. If, as Freedman suggests, agency
examiners do not suffer from an inherent absence of the skills needed to conduct hearings,
then administrative adjudication can provide a complete factual and legal record with satis-
factory resolutions.
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4. Distinctions Between Black-Robed Judges and ALJs
Contrasts between the black-robed judge and the agency ALJ may also
explain the ambivalence which impedes greater delegation of power to
agency adjudicators. While the judge must uphold the Constitution and
abide by stare decisis, 6 2 the ALJ must answer to his agency employer, and
the ALJ's decisions often remain vulnerable to agency manipulation."
The judge commands respect from the litigants because the law, either
federal or state, mandates his impartiality. On review, the appeals court
defers to the decision of the judge below unless there has been a clear
abuse of discretion. The administrative hearing examiner, however, has
not traditionally commanded such public respect because his attachment
to the agency creates the perception that he is not truly impartial, and
because the agency may disregard what it deems an unfavorable
decision.6
4
Distinctions between the judge and the ALJ can be removed, however,
through effective detachment of the ALJ from the agency whose actions
he must review. 5 As administrative agencies grow and continue to adjudi-
62. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808
(1992) ("the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such
continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable") (citation
omitted).
63. It is accurately stated:
[t]he federal judge is, after all, the personification of the judicial branch of the gov-
ernment: a robed authority figure who can demand and receive respect and obeisance
even from presidents .... ALJs, on the other hand, in spite of being called judges
and functioning as such, are subject to doubts about their independence due in part
to their employment status as agency personnel.
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus On Our Invisible Judici-
ary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 110 (1981).
64. One commentator has argued for separation of the AU from the authority of the
agency:
Consider... the unavoidable appearance of bias when an administrative law judge,
attached to an agency, is presiding in litigation by that agency against a private
party. One can fill the pages of the United States Code with legislation intended to
guarantee the independence of the administrative law judge; but so long as that judge
has offices in the same building as the agency staff, so long as the seal of the agency
adorns the bench on which that judge sits, so long as that judge's assignment to the
case is by the very agency whose actions or contentions that judge is being called on
to review, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for that judge to convey the
image of being an impartial fact finder.
Bernard G. Segal, The Administrative Law Judge, 62 A.B.A.J. 1424, 1426 (1976).
Another author notes, "[t]he fact that agency employers are often named litigants or in-
terested parties in the proceedings ALJs conduct, prevents full public confidence in the
impartiality and the fairness of those proceedings." Victor W. Palmer, The Evolving Role of
Administrative Law Judges, 19 NEw. ENG. L. REV. 755, 798 (1984). The APA promised that
administrative proceedings would be conducted with greater fairness. See id. at 761-62.
65. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:14.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1992). This section provides in
pertinent part:
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cate more conflicts between government and citizen, it becomes more evi-
dent that ALJs should be accepted as impartial adjudicators capable of
articulating legal conclusions.
III. RELEVANT ASPECTS IN THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
Legislative developments in the field of administrative law, beginning
with the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, reflect an
emphasis on improving the performance and effectiveness of agencies.
The federal and state acts, as well as the central panel system adopted in
several states, create opportunities for ALJs to excel in administrative ad-
judication and to closely attend to the legal rights asserted by hearing
participants.
A. Adjudicative Independence
The public must be assured of the adequacy and equity of the adminis-
trative process66 in order for the suspicion surrounding, regulation and
agency adjudication to dissipate. Public confidence in the administrative
process improves if agency hearing officers are required to be proficient at
analyzing and resolving complex factual and legal issues. The federal
APA, which Congress adopted in 1946, and the Model State Administra-
tive Procedure Act ("MSAPA"), approved by a majority of states,67 have
[i]n all hearings conducted in accordance with § 9-6.14:12, the hearing shall be pre-
sided over by a hearing officer selected from a list prepared by the Executive Secre-
tary of the Supreme Court and maintained in the Office of the Executive Secretary of
the Supreme Court ... The Executive Secretary shall have the power to promulgate
rules necessary for the administration of the hearing officer system.
Id.
66. See CRisis, supra note 51, at 262 ("Public skepticism of administrative expertise is
part of a larger loss of faith in many traditional sources of public and social authority.").
67. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")
originally adopted the Model State Administrative Procedure Act ("MSAPA") in 1946. See
ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINiSTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 1.1.3 (1986); 9C U.L.A. 179
(1957). In 1961, the NCCUSL revised the original version of the MSAPA in light of the
growth of state activities and the suggestions for balancing individual fairness and govern-
mental efficiency. 15 U.L.A. at 140-41 (Master ed. 1990). Subsequently, the NCCUSL ap-
proved the 1981 revision of the Model Act to reflect: the increased complexity in state ad-
ministrative law; the outgrowth of various state agencies; the judicial recognition of
legislative delegation of authority to the agencies; and the modification of due process re-
quirements as announced by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 4.
Currently, more than half of the states have an administrative procedure act based on or
substantially similar to the original version of the MSAPA or one of its revisions. See 15
U.L.A. 137, 137 (Master ed. 1990) which lists 28 states and the District of Columbia as
having adopted such statutes. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 41-22-1 to -22-27 (Repl. Vol. 1991);
ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1001 to -1066 (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-15-201 to -15-214
(Michie Repl. Vol. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-166 to -189 (West 1988); D.C. CODE:
ANN. §§ 1-1501 to -1510 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-13-1 to -13-3 (1990); HAW. REv. STAT.
§§ 91-1 to -18 (Repl. Vol. 1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5201 to -5218 (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
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provided avenues by which hearing officers can develop more complete
hearing records.
Former American Bar Association ("ABA") President Elihu Root advo-
cated the expansion of administrative agencies in a 1916 address under
the theory that agencies provide effective forums for settling disputes
with government in the age of advanced industry and social change.6 8
Later, both the ABA and the Report of the Attorney General's Commit-
tee led Congress to enact the APA in 1946.0 The APA was designed to
reform administrative procedures for greater efficiency while maintaining
judicial oversight. 0 Similarly, the MSAPA, adopted in a majority of
states, is designed to guarantee an equilibrium between governmental ef-
ficiency and the protection of individual interests.", It is submitted that
the APA has achieved fairness in administrative proceedings "because
Congress, in drafting its central provisions, struck a workable balance be-
tween prescribing fundamental principles of fair procedure and permit-
ting administrative agencies the freedom to adapt these principles to the
disparate patterns of their regulatory responsibilities. 7 2 Congress enacted
the APA to augment the influence of the federal agency hearing officer,
now entitled administrative law judge ("ALJ"), 7 to a judicial posture and
127, 1 1001 - 1021 (1981); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 17A.1 - .23 (West 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 49:950 - 971 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 8001 to 11008 (West 1989); MiD.
STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 10-201 et seq. (1984); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 33 24.201 - 24.315
(West 1981); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-43-1 to -43-19 (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 536.010 to .150
(Vernon 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-4-101 to -4-711 (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-901 to -
920 (1990); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 233B.010 - 233B.150 (Repl. Vol. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 541-A:1 to :22 (Cum. Supp. 1991); N.Y. A.P.A. LAW §§ 100 - 501 (McKinney 1984); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 250 - 323 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 183.310 et seq. (Repl. Vol.
1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-35-1 to -35-18 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-26-1 to -26-
41 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-101 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 801-
849 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 34.05.001 to .05.902 (West 1990); W. VA. CODE §3 29A-
1-1 to 29A-7-4 (Repl. Vol. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 227.01 - .26 (West 1982); Wyo. STAT. §§
16-3-101 to -3-115 (1990).
DAvis, 1983, supra note 7, § 1.10, at 36-37 adds the following: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.50 et
seq. (West 1982); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21.5-1-1 to .5-6-4 (Burns Repl. Vol. 1991); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 30A, §§ 1 -18 (Law. Co-op. 1985); and N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-8-1 to -8-25 (Michie
Repl. Vol. 1988).
68. See DAVIS, 1958, supra note 8, § 1.04, at 25. President Root proposed a greater delega-
tion of authority to agencies because they "furnish protection to rights and obstacles to
wrong doing which under our new social and industrial conditions cannot be practically
accomplished by the old and simple procedure of legislatures and courts as in the last gener-
ation." Id. (citing 41 A.B.A.R. 355, 368-69 (1916)).
69. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521.
70. The Act had the force "to satisfy the political will for reform, to improve and
strengthen the administrative process, and to preserve the basic limits upon judicial review
of administrative action." DAVIS, 1958, supra note 8, § 1.04, at 30.
71. 15 U.L.A. 5 (Master ed. 1990) (Prefatory Note to 1981 MSAPA).
72. CRISIS, supra note 51, at 266.
73. Congress approved modifying the title hearing examiner to administrative law judge
through amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act. S. REP. No. 697, 95th Cong., 2d
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to provide a guarantee of the hearing examiner's competency and impar-
tiality.74 Under the APA, the ALJ does not serve as a mere figurehead to
the agency but resolves agency disputes7" in an expeditious and inexpen-
sive manner.76 Typically, the ALJ renders an initial decision following a
hearing, which becomes the agency's final decision subject to a timely mo-
tion of appeal to the agency.77 Through the federal APA, Congress
granted the ALJ independence from a particular agency, reduced the risk
of agency tampering with the AL's conclusions customary of pre-APA
administrative proceedings, and expressed its overall confidence in the
system.
Another example of the increased independence of the agency adjudica-
tor is the adoption of the central panel system. The central panel system,
adopted by several states, pursues objectives similar to those of the fed-
eral APA but employs different methods in balancing administrative effi-
Sess. 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 496, 496. The Senate report explains that the
"change is necessary to provide consistency in terminology and eliminate confusion on the
part of the public about the role played by those officers." Id. at 4, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 496, 499.
74. One commentator noted that "[p]rior to the APA, there were no reliable safeguards to
ensure the objectivity and judicial capability of presiding officers in formal administrative
proceedings" because the agencies nominated their employees to serve as hearing examiners.
Lubbers, supra note 63, at 111 (derived from Macy, The APA and the Hearing Examiner:
Products of a Viable Political Society, 27 FED. BAR. J. 351, 355 (1967)) (citation omitted).
Additionally, the agencies did not specifically enumerate the duties of the hearing examin-
ers, and thus the APA was instrumental in "[r]eshaping the role" of the hearing officer. Id.
75. The APA was "'designed to assure that the presiding officer will perform a real func-
tion rather than serve merely as notary or policeman. He would have and should indepen-
dently exercise all the powers numbered in the [APA]."' BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMnSTRA-
TrvE LAW § 105, at 301 (1976) (citing Administrative Procedure Act of 1946: Legislative
History 207, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.).
One author poses "that the hearing examiner program [of the APA] helped to bridge the
dichotomies between earlier judicial and administrative conceptions of decision-making and
helped to substitute cooperation for conflict in court-agency relationships." See Victor G.
Rosenblum, Changing Judicial Perceptions of Administrative Decision-Making and of the
Status of Administrative Law Judges: Interrelations of Case Law with Statutory and
Pragmatic Factors in Determining ALJ Roles, 15 THE JUDGES J. 64, 65 (1976).
76. See DAVIs, 1958, supra note 8, § 1.04, at 39. Under the APA, the adjudicative process
reflects "a procedure which keeps the role of the lawyers to a minimum. Of course, the
administrative process is by no means always fast and inexpensive, but the prevailing belief
has been that it is." Id.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1988). This section specifically provides that "[w]hen the presiding
employee makes an initial decision, that decision then becomes the decision of the agency
without further proceedings unless there is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency
within time provided by rule." Id.
Section 4-215(b) of the MSAPA provides that if the presiding officer is not an agency
head, then he shall provide an initial decision which becomes final unless a litigant moves
for an appeal under § 4-216. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 4-215(b).
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ciency, ALJ independence, and due process.7 8 The central panel system,
for example, establishes a pool of ALJs, independent of a particular
agency, from which an agency requests the services of an ALJ.8 Propo-
nents contend that ALJ impartiality and competence are guaranteed
under the central panel approach because the system eliminates any ten-
dency by the ALJ to favor agency policy when making the adjudication. 0
However, the movement towards the central panel approach has not
been accomplished without resistance. The Attorney General's Commit-
tee on Administrative Procedure did not recommend that hearing exam-
iners, now ALJs,sl comprise a "separate corps" independent of a specific
agency.82 The committee reasoned that the duties of the ALJ require spe-
cialization in the particular agency in order to maximize efficiency.83 Crit-
ics of the central panel have charged that ALJs are required to perform
various tasks in their respective agencies and that creating a central panel
would add little to the protection of ALJ independence. 4 Nevertheless,
ten states85 have adopted a central panel system as an alternative to in-
78. RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 41, at 11. The authors suggest that "'[t ]he New Jersey
system, . . . based upon the concept of an independent administrative judiciary, goes fur-
ther toward ensuring fair, high caliber decisionmaking than the federal approach and those
of other states which rely upon agency affiliated hearing examiners to act as judges in cases
where their employers have a stake in the outcome.'" Id. (quoting Kestin, Reform of the
Administrative Process, 92 N.J.L. 35 (1980)).
79. See Abrams, Administrative Law Judge Systems: The California View, 29 ADMIN. L.
REV. 487, 512 (1977).
80. See Segal, supra note 64, at 1424 (suggesting that the total separation of the ALJ
from the agency would draw more adept applicants to the AU position and would
strengthen the current system).
81. Public Law No. 95-251 substituted "hearing examiners" with "administrative law
judges." 5 U.S.C.A. § 556(b)(3) (West 1992) (Historical and Statutory Note), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 95-251, § 29(a)(1), Mar. 27, 1978, 92 Stat. 183.
82. See REPORT, supra note 55, at 47.
83. Id.
84. STRAUSS, supra note 52, at 96.
85. States with a central panel system include: California, CAL. GOV'T CODE §3 11370.2,
11502 (West 1992) (Office of Administrative Hearings); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-
1001 (1988) (Division of Hearing Officers); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.65 (West 1992)
(Division of Administrative Hearings); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, § 4H (Law.
Co-op. 1988) (Division of Hearing Officers); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48 (West
1988) (Office of Administrative Hearings); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:14F-1 to :14F-
11 (West 1986) (Office of Administrative Law); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-321
(1991) (Administrative Procedural Division). See RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 41, at 28 (Ta-
ble of Summary of Key Features of Central Panel Systems).
Authors Bonfield and Asimow also list Iowa, North Carolina and Washington as adopting
the central panel approach. See ARTHUR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL AsIMow, STATE & FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 3.4, at 176 (1989); see also MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACr § 4-301(a)-(b), 15 U.L.A. 1, 98-99 (master ed. 1990) (creating an office of administrative
hearings with a director appointed by the governor, states have the option to adopt the
provision requiring admission to the state bar or a license to practice law in the United
States as a prerequisite to an ALJ position).
120 [Vol. 27:103
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
tra-agency administrative adjudication. These states place ALJs in an en-
tirely independent agency which supplies them at the request of other
agencies to administer substantive laws."' The legislative purposes out-
lined in the statutes creating the central panels emphasize due process in
the adjudications and require professionalism of the ALJs87 By removing
the ALJ from an arena where he is more susceptible to the influence of an
agency head and agency policies, the central panel system provides a
method for guaranteeing fair adjudicative procedures. With the transfer
to a separate corps, the need for examiner specialization in a particular
field decreases and the levels of independence and impartiality increase. 88
Legislative proposals have been presented to Congress to create a sepa-
rate federal corps of ALJs similar to the central panel systems established
in several states. The Administrative Law Judge Corps Act, 9 introduced
by Senator Howell Heflin, would establish a special corps of ALJs as-
signed to one of eight statutorily enumerated divisions to conduct- federal
proceedings.90 The corps of ALJs would supplant the current system of
86. RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 41, at 12. The independent agency runs a type of tempo-
rary service, contracting ALJs out to the various state agencies when they request an adjudi-
cator to conduct the hearings. In this manner, the ALJs do not serve one master, and bias in
favor of one agency is reduced. Id. Only in a few circumstances, including social service
cases in Colorado and state employee discipline questions in Minnesota, can private parties
request a hearing from the central panel. Id. at 41. The jurisdictions of the central panels
vary, with some states requiring agencies enumerated in the state APA to use the central
panel and other states permitting, but not requiring agencies to use the pool ALJs. Id. at 27.
87. The purposes articulated in New Jersey's central panel legislation provide an accurate
statement of the goals of each state in adopting the method. The legislative purpose reads:
[t]he legislative goal embodied in this bill is to create a central independent agency
staffed by professionals with the sole function of conducting administrative hearings.
This will tend to eliminate conflict of interests... promote due process, expedite the
just conclusion of contested cases and generally improve the quality of administrative
justice.
Id. at 22 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-1 (West 1986)).
88. Segal, supra note 64, at 1425.
89. S. 826, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). This legislation was referred to the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary which reported the bill out of committee without amendments on
April 30, 1992. See S. REP. No. 272, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1992). However, the Senate
failed to take further action before adjournment at the end of its session in October, 1992.
90. The bill, S. 826, proposes to create the following divisions:
(1) Division of Communications, Public Utilities and Transportation Regulation;
(2) Division of Safety and Environmental Regulation;
(3) Division of Labor;
(4) Division of Labor Relations;
(5) Division of Health and Benefits Programs;
(6) Division of Securities, Commodities and Trade Regulation;
(7) Division of General Programs; and,
(8) Division of Financial Services Institutions.
Under the bill, the Council of ALJ corps would assign ALJs to a particular division. The
Council, which constitutes the policymaking body for the corps, consists of the Chief Judge,
appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate, and the division chief judges. In
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administrative agency adjudication and consolidate all ALJs within a cen-
trally located office in Washington, D.C. Like the state central panel sys-
tem, this separate corps could promote greater adjudicative consistency
and fairness yet satisfy critics who emphasize the need for specialization.
Under the legislation, each ALJ would be assigned to a division concen-
trating on a particular subject matter.
B. Skills of the Present-Day Adjudicator
The federal and state Administrative Procedure Acts authorize ALJs to
perform a variety of judicial-like functions. 91 These tasks include receiv-
ing relevant evidence, 92 issuing subpoenas, regulating the hearing pro-
cess93 and establishing findings of fact and conclusions of law.9 4 Because
these functions resemble those performed by judges, many states require
the ALJ to have a law degree with several years of "qualifying experi-
addition to assigning ALJs to divisions, the Council appoints persons to the position of ALJ;
prescribes rules of practice, after notice and comment, for the conduct of proceedings before
the corps; issues rules for the assignment of cases; and establishes continuing education
programs to guarantee that the ALJs have sufficient training in the particular field of an
agency.
91. For a description of the ALJ, his duties and his relationship to Article III judges, see
Ronald A. Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REv. 363, 377-80 (1986).
92. The formal rules of evidence do not govern administrative proceedings. See 5 U.S.C. §
556(d) (1988). The APA permits the admission of any oral or written evidence but denies
immaterial or irrelevant evidence.
93. The APA authorizes the ALJ to:
(1) administer oaths and affirmations;
(2) issue subpoenas authorized by law;
(3) rule on offers of proof and receive relevant evidence;
(4) take depositions or have depositions taken when the ends of justice would be served;
(5) regulate the course of the hearing;
(6) hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the issues by consent of the
parties or by the use of alternative means of dispute resolution as provided in subchapter IV
of this chapter;
(7) inform the parties as to the availability of one or more alternative means of dispute
resolution, and encourage use of such methods;
(8) require the attendance at any conference held pursuant to paragraph (6) of at least
one representative of each party who has authority to negotiate concerning resolution of
issues in controversy;
(9) dispose of procedural requests or similar matters;
(10) make or recommend decisions in accordance with section 557 of this title; and
(11) take other action authorized by agency rule consistent with this subchapter.
5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
94. The Code provides that "[a]U decisions, including initial, recommended, and tentative
decisions, are a part of the record and shall include a statement of findings and conclusions,
and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion
presented on the record." 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A) (1988). In this section, the Code does not
expressly prohibit an administrative agency from addressing the constitutionality of stat-
utes. See also REPORT, supra note 55, at 50, 199 (proposed legislation).
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ence."'9 5 Similar to the ALJ in the federal system, the state ALJ carries
out his duties separately from those of other agency employees and must
adjudicate without bias towards agency policy.96 Thus, the impartiality
and confidentiality required of Article III judges are also demanded of
ALJs, who may not communicate ex parte with interested persons outside
the agency concerning the merits of a case. 7 The provisions of the federal
and model state acts assure the litigant that his claims will be reviewed
by experienced referees authorized to develop complete records with ob-
jectivity and fairness.
The central panel system also emphasizes adjudicative skill and compe-
tence without requiring ALJs to be experts in the complexities of the par-
ticular agency's policies. The intended function of the ALJ during admin-
istrative adjudication is not to specialize in agency policy but to moderate
with impartiality.98 The central panel approach demonstrates that the
ALJ need not demonstrate exceptional skill in comprehending an
agency's technical policies. Rather, the central panel creators emphasize
the prominence of fundamental fairness accorded by the ALJ to the adju-
dication, even at the expense of opposing agency policies.9 9 Accordingly,
the communication of relevant agency policies to the ALJ and the use of
expert witnesses during the hearings are suggested as remedies for the
absence of specialization requirements. 100
95. See Lubbers, supra note 63, at 113. See also RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 41, at 10
(describing the 1981 MSAPA § 4-301(b) which requires an ALJ applicant to maintain a
license to practice law in the pertinent state or in a United States jurisdiction). The authors
list California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Tennessee as requiring
ALJs to be an attorney at law or "learned" in the law. Id. at 51.
96. RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 41, at 10. The roles of the federal and state ALJ are very
similar.
97. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (1988).
98. Segal, supra note 64, at 1425. Segal refutes the argument that ALJs must specialize in
the substantive law of a particular agency.
I am no more persuaded by this thesis than I am that we need to have specialized
judges in our federal court system ... [A]dministrative law judges need not special-
ize, precisely because the lawyer before them so often does and also because expert
witnesses - specialists - may be expected to testify. Our system of adjudicating
controversies presumes that the advocate will present his case to an impartial fact
finder. It is the advocate who should be the expert on the facts in the courtroom.
Id.
99. These proponents view ALJs as "generalists," competent to address a variety of is-
sues. RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 41, at 45.
100. Norman Abrams, Administrative Law Judge Systems: The California View, 29 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 487, 503-04 (1977). Supporters of the central panel system propose these argu-
ments to critics who agree with the Report of the Committee on Administrative Procedure
that ALJs must be experts in the complexities of the particular agency in order to make
adequate conclusions.
The critics reason that without expertise, ALJs will be inefficient in resolving technical
issues and will be subject to manipulation by participants who must educate the ALJs as to
the facts and substantive law. See RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 41, at 45. The authors pre-
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C. Administrative Hearing Procedures
Current administrative hearing procedures provide additional support
for the recommendation that the ALJ should hold greater decision-mak-
ing power. For example, the APA permits the administrative litigant to
obtain legal representation for assistance during a hearing.101 The Su-
preme Court also has suggested that administrative litigants maintain the
right to retain counsel for administrative hearings if the litigant so
chooses. 102 The presence of attorneys during an administrative hearing
creates a courtroom atmosphere and strengthens the need for ALJs to be
well-versed in legal analysis.
While the attendance of counsel in an administrative proceeding offers
greater protection to the litigant, the attorney's presence may also infect
the administrative process with the sophisticated "legalese" and inexpedi-
ence common to the judicial system. Attorneys will naturally present both
factual and legal issues to an ALJ and will perhaps assert constitutional
issues for resolution. In light of the litigant's right to retain counsel and
the likelihood that the attorney will assert all legal issues which the attor-
ney believes require determination, an ALJ should be competent to ad-
dress both factual and legal issues and to draft a complete record. By
addressing all issues raised, the ALJ could accord full recognition of a
claimant's rights and satisfy the due process required of an administra-
tive hearing.103
sent the argument that "'[m]ost of the time, the best judge is the individual who possesses
the capacity by way of insight, temperament and knowledge to make fair and constructive
use of the expertise of others. A judge should not usually be the source of the information,
technical or otherwise, upon which a result is based.'" Id. at 46 (quoting Kestin, Reform of
the Administrative Process, 92 N.J.L. 35 (1980)).
101. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1988). This section states that "[a] person compelled to ap-
pear in person before an agency or representative thereof is entitled to be accompanied,
represented, and advised by counsel." Id.
102. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970). The right to retain counsel if the litigant
so desires does not mean, however, that the government must provide the litigant with an
attorney.
103. The Supreme Court expounded on the requirements of due process during the ad-
ministrative process in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In determining whether a
trial-type hearing is required, the adjudicator evaluates:
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would
entail.
Id. at 334-35. Nothing short of due process would be acceptable in the administrative hear-
ing where the goals of fairness, accuracy, efficiency, and "participant satisfaction" are para-
mount. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 258, 279 (1978).
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Under the APA, the decisions of ALJs remain subject to review by the
agency heads,104 as well as to review by Article III courts under the doc-
trine of judicial review.105 As previously noted, the Constitution entrusts
to the judiciary the power to interpret the law.108 However, it is argued
that "fact issues involving due process, equal protection, and .. .other
constitutional guarantees will in all probability no longer be subject to
court review as a matter of constitutional right."'01 7 This argument implies
that ALJs could be authorized to address legal issues such as constitu-
tional questions. In addition, once the ALJ addresses all of the litigant's
legal questions, the appeals process which permits judicial review of the
conclusions made by the agency can alleviate any concerns by the parties
that the ALJ usurped functions typically performed by the black-robed
judge.
Regarding judicial review, critics of the central panel system contend
that increased adjudicator independence during hearings is unnecessary
because Congress urges deference to the decisions of agencies 18 and em-
phasizes the significance of agency review. Although it has required judi-
cial deference to the agency's determinations of facts in the record based
on a "substantial evidence" standard,'0 9 the Supreme Court originally ex-
pressed distrust of the administrative process by requiring de novo review
of "constitutional" or "jurisdictional" facts." 0
104. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1988). This section states that "[w]hen the presiding em-
ployee makes an initial decision, that decision then becomes the decision of the agency with-
out further proceedings unless there is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency
within time provided by rule." Id.
105. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) provides that "[a]gency action[s] made reviewable by statute
and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to
judicial review." Id.
106. U.S. CONsT. art. Ill.
107. REPORT, supra note 55, at 210 (Additional Views and Recommendations of Messrs.
McFarland, Stason, and Vanderbilt). In the Appendix to the Additional Views, McFarland,
Stason, and Vanderbilt propose a Code of Standards of Fair Administrative Procedure and
recommend that upon judicial review, "due weight shall be accorded the experience, techni-
cal competence, specialized knowledge, and legislative policy of the agency involved as well
as the discretionary authority conferred upon it." Id. at 246-47.
108. Id. at 184 (citing Norman Zankel, A Unified Corps of Federal Administrative Law
Judges is Not Needed, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 723 (1984)).
109. Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 493 (1951) (noting that "[i]t is therefore
difficult to escape the conclusion that the plain language of the statutes directs a reviewing
court to determine the substantiality of the evidence on the record including the examiner's
report."); see also Lung v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986) (quoted in Martin v. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 111 S. Ct. 1171, 1175-76 (1991)) (agency's inter-
pretation of its own regulations receives substantial deference by a reviewing court); NLRB
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965) (due deference is given to agency's determination of fact
as long as there is substantial evidence in the record).
110. See Rosenblum, supra note 75, at 65. The author cites Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22 (1932), as the "prototype" of the lack of deference and overall distrust with which courts
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Recently, the Supreme Court has indicated that courts may consider
administrative interpretations of statutes on judicial review. The review-
ing court may decide that an agency maintains some responsibility for
interpreting a statute. In this situation, the judge must determine
whether the agency's conclusion is a "reasonable",one. 111 The Court ex-
plained the parameters of judicial review of an agency's statutory inter-
pretation in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil.11 2 The Court held there that upon judicial review, a court must first
consider whether Congress has explicitly addressed the exact question
under consideration.113 Where congressional intent is apparent, the court
and agency must defer to Congress' guidelines.11 4 If the court ascertains
that the legislature has not spoken on the precise question, it reviews the
agency's conclusion for a "permissible construction of the statute.11 5 The
Supreme Court's requirement of judicial deference to the reasonable stat-
utory interpretations by agencies lends some support to the argument
that the adoption of an independent group of agency adjudicators is
unnecessary.
However, Congress' codification in the APA of a de novo standard for
judicial review of questions of law in certain circumstances1 emphasizes
view the administrative hearing process, requiring trials de novo for "jurisdictional facts."
Id.
111. See STRAUSS, supra note 52, at 255; see also Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 111 S. Ct. at 1176 (if regulation's meaning is ambiguous, court defers to an
agency's "reasonable" interpretation).
112. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
113. Id. at 842.
114. Id. at 842-43; see also id. at 843 n.9 (noting that "[tihe judiciary is the final author-
ity on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which
are contrary to clear congressional intent.").
115. Id. at 843.
116. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988) states:
[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall -
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be -
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
Id.
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the Supreme
Court recognized that
[i]n all cases agency action must be set aside if the action [is] "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law". . . . And in other
equally narrow circumstances the reviewing court is to engage in a de novo review of
the action and set it aside if it [is] unwarranted by the facts.
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a distrust of agency competence. 117 Although judicial deference to admin-
istrative findings applies under certain circumstances, the final authority
to resolve issues of law continues to rest with the judiciary, particularly if
the issue involves the constitutionality of a statute.118 The Supreme
Court's holding in Chevron marks a significant step towards the recogni-
tion of an ALJ's competency to address the constitutionality of statutes.
A complete removal of the agency's influence over the ALJ, which would
be effectuated by the central panel system, would only increase public
approval for agency review of legal issues.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
The foregoing analysis provides a background for discussing whether
ALJs should have the authority to address typically legal issues. As a gen-
eral rule, if the sole issue posed in a particular case is the constitutional-
ity of a statute, a court may decide the case without waiting for an ad-
ministrative ruling."9 Many federal and state courts have not espoused
the idea that an agency adjudicator may consider a statute's constitution-
ality.120 Indeed, the Supreme Court has ordered that "[s]tate statutes,
like federal ones, are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality until
their invalidity is judicially declared. Certainly no power to adjudicate
Constitutional issues is conferred on the Administrator.' 2 1
As previously discussed, however, some states have permitted agencies
to address the legality of statutes in certain instances. Most notably, in
Southern Pacific Transportation v. Public Utilities Commission, the Su-
preme Court of California addressed the question of whether the state
Public Utilities Commission could determine the validity of statutes and
held that the agency could exercise such power. 2 2 The majority discussed
two lines of reasoning, the first requiring administrative agencies to con-
sider the constitutionality of statutes because agencies must obey the
Constitution by affording individuals their constitutional rights. The sec-
ond, conflicting line of reasoning forbids administrative agencies to deter-
Id. at 413-14 (citations omitted); see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) ("[D]e
novo review is appropriate only where there are inadequate factfinding procedures in an
adjudicatory proceeding, or where judicial proceedings are brought to enforce certain ad-
ministrative actions.") (citing Volpe, 401 U.S. at 415).
117. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review.").
118. See STRAUSS, supra note 52, at 255, 257.
119. 4 DAvIs, 1983, supra note 7, § 26:6, at 435 (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
(1975)); see also 3 DAvis, 1958, supra note 8, § 20.04, at 74 (administrative agencies may not
invalidate the will of the legislature).
120. 4 DAVIS, 1983, supra note 7, § 26:6 at 434-35.
121. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 153 (1944).
122. 556 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1976).
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mine the validity of statutes because agencies cannot invalidate legislative
intent. 123
In Southern Pacific Transportation, the California court illustrated the
difficulty of reconciling the two principles mentioned above by providing
the analogous example of a state school board's treatment of the United
States Supreme Court's rejection of the separate but equal doctrine in the
statutes of another state.124 The court reasoned that if the school board
continued to enforce a statute permitting separate but equal facilities un-
til a court invalidated it, constitutional rights would be deprived. In addi-
tion, the court asserted that a school board's enforcement of the Consti-
tution on a case by case basis without regard to whether the statute could
be enforced in another case "is wasteful, ignores reality and compels in-
tellectual dishonesty insofar as the administrator must close his eyes to
the fact that deprivation of constitutional rights will occur in all cases to
which the statute may be applied.' 25 The court accurately concluded
that it is only when the agency recognizes the invalidity of the statutes
that the agency complies with the law. 26
The principles demonstrated in the court's examination of the agency's
propriety in invalidating a statute provide a medium for continuing this
debate in other states. The California legislature conveyed its confidence
in the administrative process by granting greater judicial powers to an
administrative agency. Further, the legislature limited judicial review by
the highest state court to a consideration of whether the agency "regu-
larly pursued its authority," and whether the agency action violated the
participant's federal or state constitutional rights.127 Such deference to
the ALJ's resolution illustrates California's forward-looking approach to
resolving disputes between claimants and administrative agencies.
V. CONCLUSION
Only the development of a complete record of all issues at hand, in-
cluding the constitutionality of statutes, attains the efficient allocation of
123. Id. at 290 n.2.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 291 n.2.
126. Id.
Apart from the analogy, the court also stated that the California Constitution and stat-
utes accorded wide legislative and judicial powers to the state agency in question. Id. How-
ever, the example is important in that it reflects the significance the California court placed
on the agency's obligation to strike statutes when necessary.
127. Id. The court stated there that "Public Utilities Code section 1732 provides corpora-
tions and individuals may not raise matters in any court not presented to the commission on
petition for rehearing, reflecting, when read with the judicial review sections, legislative de-
termination that all issues must be presented to the commission." Id.
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judicial resources advocated in Mowbray v. Kozlowski 128 and complies
with the law as discussed in Southern Pacific Transportation.'" In all
likelihood, however, review by an ALJ of the constitutionality of statutes
will not be possible in most states until the purposes of administrative
procedure are accepted and the public recognizes the important services
provided by ALJs and their agencies."30
Through broad recognition that the ALJ is "functionally comparable"
to the black-robed judge,"'1 much of the concern for impartiality and
competence in ALJ adjudication would likely dissipate. Among other ad-
vantages, the detection and possible prevention of agency abuses would
be facilitated if ALJs could make initial determinations as to legal issues
raised in agency hearings. 82 The internal separation of agency functions
and increased ALJ independence recommended by the Committee on Ad-
ministrative Procedure and codified in the APA have already curtailed to
some degree an ALJ's bias favoring his agency. The establishment of a
central panel in several states serves as an example of the value in estab-
lishing agency procedures insulated from agency manipulation.
Whatever the method chosen, removal of the ALJ from the agencies
should guarantee adjudicator competence to address legal issues. Further,
legislative pronouncement of the ALJ's independence and required legal
education should assuage the critics who warn against greater delegation
of power to ALJs for reasons of ineptitude, usurpation of judicial func-
tions, violation of separation of powers and bias towards the agency. Be-
cause administrative adjudication may serve as simply the first step in
the judicial process, agency hearings function much like judicial proceed-
ings in the federal district or state trial court, as ALJ decisions may be
appealed to the judicial system if necessary to correct abuse or challenge
conclusions. 33 The right of appeal serves as a final check on an ALJ's
128. 724 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va. 1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1990).
129. 556 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1976).
130. Lubbers, supra note 63, at 109-12. The author notes that "[o]ne indication of the
importance of ALJs as lawmakers and law appliers is suggested by the fact that they out-
number by two to one the corps of United States district court judges who preside over the
nation's entire federal and criminal trial docket." Id. at 109.
131. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
132. See Note, The Authority of Administrative Agencies, supra note 50, at 1690. The
author asserts that allowing agencies to consider the constitutionality of statutes may curb
agency excesses by focusing administrative attention on constitutional restrictions. Id.
133. One state court has advocated permitting an agency to examine certain legal
questions:
While we have strictly confined the power of constitutional review to the judiciary, we
have not found the delegation of quasi-judicial powers to executive branch agencies
- including the power to determine facts and apply the law thereto - to be a viola-
tion of the constitutional provision for the separation of powers of government so
long as the determinations of those agencies lack judicial finality and are subject to
judicial review.
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resolution of important legal and factual issues. Most importantly, the
agency adjudication process maximizes judicial economy and satisfies due
process by providing a complete record and resolution of all issues raised.
A standard of deference like that applied to the agency in Southern Pa-
cific Transportation would further facilitate the claimant's interest in
swift but thorough settlement of her claim for government benefits.
C. Stuart Greer
Quam v. State, 391 N.W.2d 803, 809 n.6 (Minn. 1986) (citing Breimhorst v. Beckman, 35
N.W.2d 719, 734 (Minn. 1949) (legislative grant of adjudicative powers to exclusive workers'
compensation system upheld against separation of powers challenge)).
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